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## NOTES FOR MR. McCONE AND GENERAL CARTER

Our objections to the present implementation of the NRO Agreement can be broken down into five separate charges:

1. The present NRO is characterized by the Under Secretary of the Air Force doubling as the Director NRO and supported by an Air Force staff. It serves broadly as the agent of the Air Force in acting consistently to eliminate the CIA from the National Reconnaissance Program. You will recall your conversation with Secretary Gilpatric last June wherein he admitted that there was a strong feeling expressed by General LeMay, and apparently supported passively by General Taylor and Secretary McNamara, that the time had come to move all reconnaissance operations from CIA to the Department of Defense. The following actions would tend to support Air Force desire to eliminate CIA from the NRO:

A. A review of the record indicates that virtually all decisions made by the DNRO during the past 18 months, as between CIA and the Air Force, have gone to the Air Force. This trend has been discussed with Dr. McMillan, who candidly admits this, but insists that there were adequate reasons for each of the individual decisions made.

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B. We have clear intent on Dr. McMillan's part to assign all satellite programs to General Greer in the Air Force. He makes this statement openly to his staff and all his actions bear it out.

C. There is reluctance, put in the frankest possible terms, to accept genuine joint staffing in the NRO. Admittedly he has accepted three CIA specialists to the NRO Staff, but only after the strongest urging by General Carter, Bross, and myself, and this action by no means constitutes a joint approach to the NRO staffing program.

D. NRO has consistently refused to include the CIA Deputy Director as a co-working partner in its activities, first with Scoville and now with Gene Kiefer.

E. NRO responses to the Purcell Panel report were prepared completely by Air Force personnel and explicitly avoided soliciting the views of either the Agency or Mr. Kiefer.

F. Even in OXCART, following the surfacing of the A-11, the DNRO has attempted to exclude CIA from knowledge of Air Force intentions. Since 2 March, we have attempted to coordinate efforts with DNRO to provide the SST industry with certain technology from the OXCART effort. Several attempts to determine Air Force actions following the surfacing were ignored by the DNRO. Quite by accident, we

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learned from Kelly Johnson that he had been provided guidance on this subject directly from Dr. McMillan. In fact, Mr. Johnson was provided an instruction paper by the Air Force which the Agency has as yet to see. When confronted with the knowledge of our information, Dr. McMillan admitted that possibly he should have shown the paper to us; however, he has continued to delay producing the document.

2. There is an evident aggressive intent on the part of DNRO and the NRO Staff to press the Agency personnel involved in the NRO programs as hard as possible in ways that are far less than "cricket".

A. Very large cuts were made in Program B's budget requirements prepared by Col. Ledford, except for TAGBOARD which was left intact, even though the TAGBOARD is the least developed and its operational utilization the most questionable of all Program B's programs, and you will recall the Purcell Panel was not very enchanted with the idea. <sup>TAGBOARD</sup> <sup>ADDITIONALLY,</sup> Dr. McMillan took it upon himself to approach Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney independently in an effort to reduce Program B's budget. When challenged on this point, Dr. McMillan agreed that he might have been more tactful, but showed no inclination

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to remedy the pattern. The undercutting of Program B's relationship with the contractors was obvious and they ~~now~~ came to realize that the control of the program really rested with Dr. McMillan who controlled the funds.

B. The NRO Staff delayed the installation of the ITEK 112A satellite camera in the U-2 for many months, inspite of the fact that this has proven a remarkable advancement in our aerial photography. Closer inspection reveals that the Air Force on its own was attempting to employ the HYAC camera in their own U-2's and obviously preferred to use this camera rather than the superior 112A.

C. McMillan and Fubini have been absolutely merciless in their personal and organizational attacks on the counter-measure program for OXCART. It is evident that they do not desire the Agency to pursue programs on a sound technical and financial basis and, in fact, have publicly stated their low opinion of the Agency personnel capabilities. After many months of justification and explaining our intentions, it has been decided by DOD that CIA must first seek approval from Dr. Fubini regarding any counter-measure program or task we intend to initiate. This same

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treatment is not confined to the countermeasure area and can be expected elsewhere.

D. It is abundantly clear that any line item on the Program B budget will come in for continuing and severe examination down to the nearest thousand dollars, whereas very large R&D and improvement slush funds are permitted in General Greer's organization to the tune of  dollars.

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3. The NRO has indeed been slow in acknowledging its responsiveness to the needs of the Intelligence Community and has manifested itself as a power apart from its customers:

A. From July 1962 until May 1963 the NRO Staff repeatedly refused to provide COMOR with operational data pertinent to the development of long-range satellite requirements, and it was only eventually obtained through the insistence of the Chairman of the Board himself. COMOR sporadically suffers an impasse with the NRO in trying to explain that COMOR requires knowledge of the capability of collection systems if it hopes to task the variety of available capabilities with appropriate targets.

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B. We possibly have experienced degradation in the volume and quality of satellite intelligence collection through the NRO's decision to alter launch times, and inclination angles, /duration of mission to accommodate R & D efforts

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C. In the past we have also seen the tendency on the part of the NRO to cancel growing programs which were producing intelligence, i. e. CORONA, in favor of new programs which had not yet been flight tested and proven as reliable collectors of intelligence data.

4. A clear pattern is evident in NRO operations whereby major program decisions are being made without informing or consulting with the CIA. This pattern has survived a series of working level meetings among McMillan, Fubini, and myself which have largely been devoted to a variety of efforts on their part to force me to agree to their mission assignment proposals. Very little substance has been touched in these sessions inspite of my efforts.

A. We know from working-level contacts with Eastman Kodak that a system known as G-3 has been started which is presumably a fallout of the VALLEY R & D Program. We understand that this will be a very high resolution spotting

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system, with a ground resolution in the neighborhood

[ ] and a 4.8 mile swath width. To date,

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we do not know what the schedule or funding or responsibilities for this program are, and yet it will surely run in the hundreds of millions of dollars. More important, COMOR is not aware of this development nor have they been approached regarding the requirement to accept only a 4.8 mile strip. Undoubtedly, there are tradeoffs which by accepting a slight degradation in inches of resolution greater swath coverage is possible.

B. Last fall at the review of the NRO budget it was decided that we would delay the launching of the next LANYARD payload until the results of the GAMBIT firings were clear. McMillan and the NRO Staff took this decision and immediately canceled the entire LANYARD program. It was clear to me that Greer was anxious to eliminate the technical and budget complexes for GAMBIT which LANYARD provided. Quite aside from the motive of the Air Force, it is clear that a simple agreement on delay was unilaterally expanded in a program-cancel mandate without informing us.

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C. GAMBIT-J appeared in the proposed 1965 NRO budget as a very expensive R & D program in parallel with the regular GAMBIT firings. This was to be a double recovery of the GAMBIT which would have allowed more frequent recovery of the high resolutions film. Agreement was never reached with the Agency that a double bucket version should be developed. Having written it into the budget, however, we now understand that it has been removed and the monies reprogrammed for the G-3. The point of the complaint here is that these represent major decisions which have not been discussed frankly and freely with the Agency.

D. When an agreement was finally reached between NASA, Department of Defense, and CIA covering how the camera technology of the National Reconnaissance Program could be exploited in lunar mapping, it fell to the NRO to decide which of its assets should be responsible for working with NASA. McMillan instantaneously made the decision that it should be General Greer and the camera controls of the GAMBIT system used. The objection here is that the Agency was not consulted and the only record in our files is a memo from Fubini recommending a plan which, in fact, backstopped the decision that McMillan had already

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5. The technical record of the NRO planning and development has not been good:

A. There has been a clear lack of any forward thinking on the research or advanced search systems. In fact, there is doubt that anyone in the Air Force complex made an effort to understand this mission or appreciate the contribution CORONA has made.

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B. McMillan and most of the NRO Staff candidly admit that they do not understand the

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C. A unilateral Air Force Program to upgrade the CORONA system so as to comply with the Purcell Panel recommendations was developed by General Greer's people and approved by Dr. McMillan. After critical examination it appears that this program was not responsive to the requirement and, in fact, represented only a collection of existing improvement proposals which they had wanted to fund anyway. No clear evaluation of the problem had been attempted, nor was any real solution presented in the Air Force plan.

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D. More recently we have had a determined proposal to transfer all of the CORONA Program to General Greer because this unified solution was supposed to cure the

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technical problems being encountered last fall in CORONA. It was clear to me in my two days with McMillan on the West Coast in February that he was only then learning the basic things about CORONA Program which most of us take for granted. Considering his state of ignorance about the Program in February, I doubt that he could have honestly recommended the transfer in the fall on other than bureaucratic grounds.

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